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provide and, above all, a commitment to the central values found in 
the arts and the humanities. I have no argument with that, nor with 
the specific list of values to which Carsaniga draws attention in his 
paper. Perhaps our agreement could also extend to the following 
concluding consideration. 
We have to recognise that a study of the arts and humanities is 
likely to throw up conflicting views about the nature of value and to 
furnish us with conflicting sets of values. The absence of agreement 
on a common set of values and the fragmented state of modem 
culture are further components of the problems which beset us. In 
this situation, the idea of a unified culture marked by a common 
measure of minds, and some shared set of general beliefs (including 
perhaps some myths), and commitment to a common set of values, 
commends itself. At the same time, unity within a culture is not an 
unalloyed good, as any careful reader of Plato's Republic or 
observer of modem totalitarian states would recognise. Concern 
with a basic sense of common good, in terms of respect and justice 
and related values, is necessary across a society and between 
peoples to overcome harmful factionalism and the damaging effects 
of fragmentation and to promote the conditions for our wellbeing 
and the wellbeing of the world of which we are part. But such 
concern does not require anything like a totally unified community 
characterised by uniform beliefs and practices and moral unanimity. 
I do not think that it is best to see culture as a single whole. A 
society can be best understood, as Aristotle proposed, as a com-
munity of communities within which a wide variety of associations 
and practices can flourish. Some values need to run across the 
whole of a society, but the unity of a rich culture presupposes the 
existence of immense diversity. 
Rejoinder 
OIDV ANN! CARSANIOA 
I welcome Paul Crittenden's response because, as he himself 
points out, it is difficult to deal unambiguously with complex issues 
in the space of a couple of sentences; and what he writes helps me 
to explain my position. By denying the existence of a dichotomy 
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between the arts and the sciences, and by affirming the need for 
both to pursue the advancement of knowledge in a rational and 
rigorous manner, I did not intend to suggest that there may not be 
diversity in unity, or that the same standards of proof should prevail 
in both humanities and sciences. It would certainly be a mistake to 
model all philosophical inquiry on mathematics for the very good 
reason that not all scientific inquiry is modelled on mathematics. 
Since the days of Heisenberg and GMel scientists have come to 
realise that many problems in physics and indeed in mathematics 
cannot be subject to a clear decision procedure or to logically 
rigorous proof any more than (even if not in the same sense as) 
problems in philosophy or literary criticism. Some areas of human 
knowledge may be more concerned with facts, and some others 
with values, principles and criteria: but this is a distinction common 
to both sciences and the humanities. 
I concur with Dr Crittenden'S view that the problems we 
contend with are deeply embedded in our culture and cannot be 
accounted for solely by reference to the characters or doings of our 
politicians. It is nevertheless those whom we allow to carry the 
responsibility of government who spend trillions on arms, wage 
wars, cut University funds, allow industry to pollute the environ-
ment, etc., not the common people. Whether Eisenhower is in 
power, or Bush, may not make much difference: but I still have to 
hear from the present incumbent any warning about the excessive 
powers of the industrial-military complex. The point I was trying to 
make is that we cannot afford to let our politicians run the whole 
show, because most of them do not understand the long-tenn con-
sequences of their myopic and ill-informed short-tenn decisions. 
And, since the problems are embedded in our culture, we have to 
revise and refonn our own conception of what culture is and does. 
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